Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – September 13, 1987

I arrived at the parliament at half past six in the morning. In the reports, the trip of Mr. Xavier Perez Decoyar, the Secretary General of the United Nations, is at the top of the news. until half past ten I stayed in the public meeting. There were many referrals from the representatives. Malik Ashtar battalion came from Khuzestan warriors. I spoke for them.

Mr. [Haji Zabihullah] Bakshi, a famous Hizbollah, came. He asked for permission to bring a Hezbollah group in front of the [UN] Secretary General to declare readiness to continue the war. I said it is not necessary.

The president of Ahvaz University came. He asked for help to solve the war problems in the university. In the afternoon, Mr. [Ali Mohammad] Besharti [Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs] came, reported his trip to China and brought the message of the Prime Minister of that country that we should not return the Secretary General [of the United Nations] empty-handed, and expressed concern about the pressure if the Security Council is disappointed.

Mr. Naseri came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He explained the negotiations with the Secretary General [of the United Nations] so far. He proposed materials for my negotiations with him and the schedule of my private meeting with the Secretary General with his own suggestion; I accepted Dr. Velayati came in the evening and told about the negotiations with the Secretary General [of the United Nations] until that hour.

Then we had a detailed meeting with [Mr. Decuiar] the Secretary General [of the United Nations]. They want the ceasefire to be accepted first, then other things, and we want the aggressor to be introduced first, and then other things. Finally, we made the meeting private; Me and the Secretary General and Mr. [Siros] Naseri as translator. It was supposed to be Dr. Velayati. The deputy secretary general said that if there is a province, he should be also, and therefore he will not remain a province. More frank negotiations were held. He threatened that the Council will not accept this and I threatened, we will mobilize the public and take the war more seriously. Finally, Bana said, "My feeling is that if the aggressor identification committee is formed, Iran will not be active on the fronts, until the results of the committee's work are announced, and then there will be a ceasefire."

The children of martyrs, captives, missing and disabled people came to Khorasan. I spoke for them. Mr. Mahmoudi, our ambassador came to Sierra Leone. He reported the situation there and emphasized that we should sell oil to them. One of the IRGC special operations personnel came. He complained about the lack of coordination between the IRGC and the Ministry of Intelligence.

The night of the meeting was in Ayatollah Khamenei's office. Mr. [Seyd Zia] Mir Emadi [Tehran Public Prosecutor] came. He complained about Molouk al-Tawaifi at the [Mehrabad] airport in Tehran. Things were supposed to be centralized. Mr. [Majid] Ansari, the person in charge of the [organization of] prisons [and security and educational measures], came and criticized the Ministry of Information's program regarding holding prisons for detainees. It was decided to prepare a comprehensive regulation for the coordination of prison affairs and information. informed that the number of security prisoners in many cases is less than the number advertised by the enemies; It was supposed to be announced in such a way.

Dr. Velayati presented the summary of the negotiations with the Secretary General of the United Nations. In short, the Secretary General left Iran with the feeling that if the committee to investigate the aggressor and responsible for the war is ready to start working, we will not show any movement on the front until the result is known, which will be within three weeks. Provided that Iraq is not evil. In the case of France, it was decided not to be strict in the details and let Congolese have an open hand. There was a discussion about the risk of conflict with America in the Persian Gulf, and its probability is not weak, but the majority of the meeting [of the heads of forces] do not agree with the Imam's order for mobilization [general for forced deployment to the fronts].