Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – June 22, 1999
Mr. [Seyed Ali Asghar] Mousavi, the proprietor of an export-oriented date packaging facility, came from Bushehr.He reported on his success in marketing and complained about the Agricultural Bank (Bank Keshavarzi) for refusing to grant a loan, which has brought his business to the verge of closure.
Mr. [Seyed Ali Asghar] Mousavi, the proprietor of an export-oriented date packaging facility, came from Bushehr.He reported on his success in marketing and complained about the Agricultural Bank (Bank Keshavarzi) for refusing to grant a loan, which has brought his business to the verge of closure. In the past, he was among the IRGC and frontline [war] veterans.
Mr. [Seyed Mohammad Ali] Kamrava, [Head of the Khorramshahr Relief Headquarters], arrived. He provided a report on the poverty, problems, and unemployment in Khorramshahr. He also complained about the situation of the Eucalyptus Agro-Industry Institute, which is under construction in Khorramshahr, and the lack of cooperation from the Governor-General, the management of the Khuzestan Sugarcane Project, and the Central Bank.
In the afternoon, Mr. [Alireza] Bigdeli, our ambassador to Azerbaijan, arrived. He suggested that we advise Mr. [Abdolnaser] Hemmati, the [Governor] of [Central] Insurance, to accept the ambassadorship of Azerbaijan. He said [Heydar] Aliyev, [the President of Azerbaijan], is currently trying to position his son [Ilham Aliyev] to succeed him. He reported on the distortion of my remarks during my recent meeting with the Speaker of the Parliament of Azerbaijan. I had said that we love the territory of Azerbaijan just like Iran, and because of the historical background and the Shia faith of its people, we assist it. Some of the Azerbaijani media had interpreted this as Iran's territorial claim, which has been formally denied.
Mr. [Mohammad] Forouzandeh arrived. He consulted with me about accepting the management of the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs (Bonyad-e Janbazan); it has been offered to him on behalf of the Supreme Leader. Even though he had brought up excuses and conditions so that they wouldn't accept, they have agreed to all of them. His Istikhara [seeking guidance from God] also turned out bad; yet they still insist. I told him that if the Supreme Leader insists, it is not appropriate to decline, even though it entails many difficulties. He highly praised my 1981 memoir book—Crossing the Crisis—and said it is the best historical document for Iran. Mohsen arrived. He brought a sample translation of my memoir book, The Era of Struggle, which has been prepared in Lebanon, for me to authorize. It had already been translated and published in Egypt.
At night, along with the heads of the three branches [of government] and the intelligence and court officials regarding the accused in the chain murders, we had a meeting at the Supreme Leader's office upon his invitation. It lasted until midnight. They provided some explanations regarding their motives and the causes of Saeed Emami's suicide, which are unacceptable. [Mr. Ali Younesi], the Minister of Intelligence, expressed concern over the tension and unrest within the Ministry. Decisions were made regarding the continuation of the investigation, follow-ups, and public information dissemination.
During the discussions in the presence of the Supreme Leader, all efforts were directed towards identifying the murderers [in the chain murders case], especially Saeed Emami, as agents of foreign spy networks, for which no evidence was presented, and the analysis of Mr. [Mohammad] Niazi, [Head of the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces], is also weak. Mr. Khatami suggested that the Supreme Leader issue a statement regarding his [Emami's] suicide, which was not agreed upon.
On the way home, Mr. [Seyed Mohammad] Khatami, [the President], got into my car. He complained about the Supreme Leader, stating that he had been strict regarding the issue of the 13 Jews accused of espionage, not allowing the government and the Supreme National Security Council to intervene in resolving their problems, and had revoked Mr. Khatami's order permitting the release of a few of them.
To calm the intense global atmosphere, Mr. Khatami had told the Minister of Intelligence to release some of the 13 Jews whose charges were ungrounded. However, the Supreme Leader opposed this and told him to inform the Minister that the order was cancelled. Mr. Khatami requested that the Supreme Leader himself communicate this to Mr. Younesi, and he immediately ordered its cancellation through Mr. [Seyed Ali Asghar] Hejazi.
At dinner, I suggested that the issue of the Jewish spies be delegated to the Supreme National Security Council; the Supreme Leader did not accept. It later became clear that this was due to this very stance and Mr. Khatami's order regarding the release of some of them; he [the Supreme Leader] believes one must stand firm.