Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – March 2, 1984

After the morning prayer, I asked the Najaf camp for an explanation about last night's operation. It turned out that they have made progress in retrieving the same embankment yesterday. They said that the enemy used a chemical bomb and disrupted wireless communications - which is a means of directing and coordinating the units involved.

I asked two camps in Najaf and Karbala to come to this camp to determine the task of the future plan of the Khyber operation, and I told Colonel Mousavi Qavidel to prepare a plan for the work.

The progress of the war has become very difficult. Iraq's television and radio advertisements have a negative effect on the troops and they take advantage of our weaknesses and lack of success. There is also the pressure of the air force and the harm of chemical bombs.

I told the president about the situation and warned him not to speak too optimistically during Friday prayers. We walked around the camp with Dr. Rouhani and discussed the war situation and other issues. The presence of Dr. [Hasan] Rouhani in the camp is useful for my work. The sound of cannons from the war front could be heard regularly; Although it is more than a hundred kilometers away. We guessed that the enemy's attack was going on.

When we returned to the headquarters, we received a report from listening to the enemy's conversations that they claimed to have taken our embankment and pushed back the forces from the position we gained last night. If it is true, it will mess up our program.

We saw a video of the operation in the east of the Tigris and the occupation period around Korna. It showed the attack of Iraqi tanks and airplanes on the infantry and behind the trenches that were defending.

In the evening, all the commanders and officials of the military and army camps came. The operation was summarized and we came to the conclusion that we must be very quick to preserve the island. The importance of the island was relied upon and [it was decided] to continue the operation, a plan would be prepared by each of the bases and it would be implemented after approval.

Mr. Sayad [Shirazi] and [Mohsen] Rezaei separately said things about the command and the problems of the other side. In practice, it became clear that the root of the problems lies in the differences of opinion of the main commanders of the front and the army and the IRGC; Although everyone is sincere, in the end, the differences of opinion are serious; There are two completely different methods in a single operation. We came to Tehran at night. We arrived at eleven o'clock at night.