Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – February 24, 1984

Early in the morning, we learned that the enemy had struck the two cities of Borujerd and Khorramabad with missiles, and nearly 100 people had been martyred and 350 wounded, with extensive destruction caused. It was decided to announce the news of the capture of the oil-rich Majnoon Island to counter Saddam's propaganda, and to strike the cities of Iraq from Paveh. The Air Force also carried out two or three operations in this regard in Al-Amarah and Rawanduz.

The helicopters became operational today with a delay, and to some extent the problems on the other side of the Hawizeh Marshes were resolved. Today the situation at the War Propaganda Headquarters was not good, and the work on the communiqués was incomplete.

In the afternoon, [Mr. Esfandiyar Hosseini] the Navy commander came to say that the hovercraft could not be brought from the Persian Gulf to the marshes. Last night, through [Ayatollah] Mr. Khamenei, we had asked that they be brought. To resolve the problem, I asked Mr. Esfandiyar Hosseini to go to the Najaf Headquarters, inspect the marshes, and make the final decision.

News came that the cities of Kuhdasht, Pol-e Dokhtar, and Mahabad had been bombed by aircraft and a number of people had been martyred. We spoke with the Air Force so that, in retaliation, they would strike Baghdad.

In the afternoon, the fuel in the F-14 aircraft's tanks, which protect the front's airspace, had run out. At five o'clock they were forced to return to the base. The Army Aviation also stopped its operations. As soon as the F-14s left, the enemy aircraft became active and struck the road.

At the beginning of the night, we were supposed to consult with the three headquarters here. [The] Najaf [Headquarters] was occupied and could not come. [The] Karbala [Headquarters] came, and I spoke at length with Mr. Sayyad. He has some objections. We still have the problem of disagreements. The greater part of the Army's forces are effectively idle and somewhat time-consuming.

After consultation at Headquarters, we decided that [the] Karbala [Headquarters] should prepare its forces to cross the line and take advantage of the success of [the] Najaf [Headquarters] - if the Tala'iyah road is opened. They had dinner and left.

Messrs. Mohsen Rafighdoost and Rahim Safavi came. They were upset. A problem had arisen on the fronts of the Najaf Headquarters. The link that was supposed to be established between the forces stationed on the islands and the Tala'iyah front, opening a land route to the islands, had not been achieved. In practice, they had made a major mistake as follows: last night at the Najaf Headquarters, it was proposed that they operate from both sides and link up. Mr. Sayyad [Shirazi] objected and proposed sending more fresh forces to the island and building up the necessary strength for the following night; the IRGC commanders also approved. They ordered the units not to operate that night, but we soon learned that from inside the island, the Najaf Ashraf Division had acted alone, struck the enemy from the rear, and made good progress, reaching close to Tala'iyah and also capturing the Tala'iyah bridge. We were forced to tell the Muhammad Rasulullah (PBUH) Division to operate during the day and link up, but the daytime operation was unsuccessful and was postponed until night. On the other hand, at the Al-Azair Strait, the enemy had also captured the bridge and the strait and had penetrated to the east of the Tigris along the Tigris from Qurnah to Al-Azair, and except for one point, the enemy controlled the Tigris. In this way, it had also secured the main Basra-Amarah route and could bring in forces effectively. We were also upset by this news, which they had not informed us of until then.

The plan was for them to operate at night with the fresh forces that had been airlifted in, retake Al-Azair, operate south of the islands, and establish the linkup. This operation had been approved before my command at the headquarters, especially at the Central Headquarters. The initiative had come from the IRGC. The IRGC command believes that the enemy cannot be defeated through ordinary conventional operations and that forces must enter through points where the enemy is caught off guard, using the IRGC's special methods; such as these marshes, the island, and so on. But the Army command does not consider such operations compatible with its training, experience, equipment, and personnel, and is unwilling to participate in them. Independently, it also cannot conduct significant operations. This contradiction has brought matters to the point where someone outside the armed forces - someone like me - has to be responsible for coordination and command. They carry out the orders, but because they do not believe in them, the desired effectiveness is not achieved.

We must use this experience for future operations, from the very beginning of planning and preparations.