Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – February 23, 1984

I got up at dawn. I received the news in the operations room. Kربلا Headquarters was unsuccessful and Najaf Headquarters was successful, but they were dissatisfied with the performance of the Army Aviation helicopters. Army Aviation was supposed to transport thousands of troops to the other side of the water; but it had taken fewer than a thousand. I stressed that they should continue, but with the considerations they have, they cannot comply with the demands of the Guards.

News is coming of heavy casualties at Kربلا Headquarters. Colonel Sayyad [Shirazi] said he would come here to receive instructions. At around nine in the morning, Messrs. Sayyad [Shirazi] and Hasani Sa'di arrived. A meeting of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters was held. He proposed that since Kربلا Headquarters had been unsuccessful, the operation should be halted and part of its forces used for defense and the rest employed at Najaf Headquarters. He proposed that Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters itself take command of the operation and that Mohsen Rezaei and Sayyad [Shirazi] act as deputy operations commanders. We did not accept this much, but agreed that part of forces be placed at the disposal of Khatam Headquarters as reserves and part be placed at the disposal of Najaf Headquarters.

We sent Colonel Hasani Sa'di to Kربلا Headquarters to reassure the troops and prepare them for another push. We also told Colonel Sayyad Shirazi to go to Najaf Headquarters and get Army Aviation moving to transport the troops. They have lost morale and have also conveyed their weakness to Tehran. I deemed it necessary to boost their morale. We explained to Tehran that capturing the Hoveyzeh Marshes and reaching the Tigris and the [Majnoon] Islands is very important and could seriously threaten Iraq's 3rd and 4th Corps.

The air defense around the headquarters was activated several times. I went and checked on it personally; it turned out they had acted cautiously. The radar had shown nothing.

Contrary to expectations, the enemy air force is not active; even though there are many undefended targets for them in Khuzestan and in the desert. They made one attack as well, but lost an aircraft; perhaps because of the good presence of the F-14s.

One of the ongoing tasks is monitoring the military communiqués.

To save the forces of Nasr Headquarters that are trapped in al-Ghadir, we told the air force to strike the enemy. Requests for sending troops by helicopter are constantly coming from Najaf Headquarters, and they complain about their lack of activity. In the afternoon they informed us that my presence at Najaf Headquarters was necessary to resolve the problems and get things back on track.

At dusk we set out by car, wearing بسیج uniforms. On the way, the activity of the air defense caught our attention. We reached Najaf Headquarters early in the evening. We prayed the evening prayer. We sat down to review the results of the operation: Najaf Headquarters was fifty percent successful and Kربلا Headquarters unsuccessful. Changes were made to the missions and I issued the orders.

Mr. Sayyad [Shirazi] was assigned to get the helicopters moving and remedy this major shortage. The plan for tomorrow's operation was arranged. We headed toward Khatam Headquarters. On the way we came upon a combat unit that was waiting for helicopters in the desert. I got out and spoke with them. Seeing me in a بسیج uniform was unexpected and uplifting for them. It made for an interesting scene. They chanted slogans.

On the way we passed close to the front. The sight of the flashes of active artillery and the enemy's flares, indicating their fear, was striking. We reached the headquarters at eleven. We watched Iraqi television. It said it was showing footage of the war east of Basra. But for more than an hour, it broadcast only old and vulgar songs and dancing and singing in praise of Saddam and to honor him. It is a sign of disruption in their programming. The next day, too, news came of disruption.

Several ministers came to the headquarters. [Dr. Monafi,] the Minister of Health, said that around a thousand wounded had been sent to [medical] centers. Compared with other operations, this is low. About 150 identified martyrs and several missing persons have been reported.

I had summoned the commanders of the divisions, brigades, and battalions that had taken part in Kربلا; they came. They are disheartened. I reassured them, and they expressed readiness to act, but not on the same axis. From the beginning, the Ground Forces command had not been favorable toward this operation and had reservations and qualifications in almost all the briefing sessions in Tehran. Naturally, these views affected the conduct of the operation in the field. The integration of the Guards and the Army in the operation, under Army command, has not produced good results, and the Guards are dissatisfied with it. We also had problems with that part of Army Aviation that had been placed under the command of Najaf Headquarters, and eventually, through the intervention of the Ground Forces commander [Colonel Sayyad Shirazi], it was resolved to some extent.