Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – February 20, 1984

After the morning prayer, Mr. [Hossein] Kharazi, the commander of the army of Imam Hossein (AS) came; It turned out to be ready for action. Last night, due to lack of preparation, we delayed [the operation] for one night. In the morning session, coordination became stronger. I got acquainted with the quality of Karbala camp operation. Ahmad Agha was given health news by phone; The imam has made a condition that I will regularly give health information.

The front's breakfast was better than the city, home and assembly: cheese, jam, butter and cheese. After breakfast, we saw the surroundings of the camp. is equipped; Especially the building itself. We went to Dehlaran by car. To see the area and military centers, we went to Ain Khosh barracks and returned from the Abu Ghraib oil area. We saw the effects of the presence of Iraqis.

It was reported that three of our identified people have been captured by the enemy. There is a risk of work being leaked through captives. Mr. Mohsen Rezaei [commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] is upset. We suggested speeding up the action, but the army does not agree. We have to decide tonight.

The commanders of Changule operation also came. They reported their work. It was interesting and listenable. They were guided to carry out their future plans. The quality of Jabeh's lunch is better than the cities: chicken, rice, yogurt and Dezfuli oranges.

In the evening, we left for Najaf camp. We visited the liberated parts of Khuzestan for three hours - from the camp to Talaiyeh - on the way. We saw the effects of Saddamian's occupation, including burnt tanks, trenches and military roads. We lost our way two or three times. The attacking forces of the Khyber operation were scattered on the way and did not enter the front so that the enemy would recognize the attack from their gathering.

We reached Najaf camp early in the night. They were waiting for us. [This camp] is the command headquarters of the IRGC for the northern front, which should be launched from Hur and Talaiyeh. After the Maghrib prayer, in the presence of the commanders of the army and the army, we discussed the preparations and the progress of the works, the deficiencies and the operation plans. Operation goals are very important and strategic. The main and important goal is to settle on the eastern bank of the Tigris and cut off the road from Basra to Baghdad, in which case the necessary leverage will be obtained to take our rightful demands and end the war. By cutting off this road, it is not easy for Iraq to maintain the city of Basra, and without Basra, Iraq is very weak. The second goal of the operation is to dominate the important oil area of ​​the Majnoon Islands, which can guarantee war compensation. We slept around twelve o'clock at night. They said that the Iraqis built the camp when they occupied this part of Iran. For the first time, I shared an important discussion with them that had different reactions; Some liked it and some didn't like it. I said, the opinion of me and some high-ranking officials of the system is that if we carry out a successful operation inside the Iraqi territory and capture an area from the enemy, with which we can put pressure on Iraq after [accepting] the ceasefire and take our right, then the ceasefire should be agreed to. This area can be the same, and since we don't have anything in hand yet, it is not suitable, but if this goal is achieved, it can be discussed with the Imam. Those who were opposed said that the slogan "war war until victory" or "war war until the elimination of sedition from the world" has become "war war until a victory" and they said expressing this opinion may discourage the fighters who are fighting to reach Karbala and Quds. The supporters were also happy.