Memoirs of Akbar Hashemi – February 19, 1984

After the prayer, I read the reports. We didn't care. In the public meeting, before the order, I spoke about the martyrdom of Sheikh Ragheb Harb and the assassination of Mr. Mohtashmi and Operation Wal-Fajr 5. In the meeting, they informed that Mr. Mohsen Rezaei has informed from the front that it is necessary to contact them. [Ayatollah] Mr. Khamenei also asked for the same thing. I left the meeting to Mr. Yazdi and called the Front in the office. Mr. Rezaei said with the code that we have, that the people of the region have been informed about the operation and it is not advisable to delay and the army is not ready either. He wanted a solution.

I went to the president's office. We consulted and decided that I should personally go to the front camp and solve the problem. Previously, [Ayatollah] Mr. Khamenei and I both wanted to go. We decided to ask the Imam; The Imam forbade [Ayatollah] Mr. Khamenei to go. This is because they have little physical strength. I told the [army] advisory office to prepare the travel equipment. We also informed the front.

In the evening, I went to Imam's service to say goodbye. They were very kind and prayed for the journey in my ear. I had a chance to kiss the imam. They issued the order to command the operation in my name, and Ahmad Agha brought it home. According to Imam's decree, from now on, I have been assigned the command of operations on the front. Considering the responsibility of the parliament and other affairs, it is a heavy task, but the situation of the fronts and the difference between the commanders of the army and the corps seems to have made the solution unique to this task. If [Ayatollah] Mr. Khamenei did not have physical problems and the responsibility of the presidency, he would have been elected. Imam's other argument is that I have two vice presidents and in my absence there are those who run the parliament, but the president does not have a deputy. I left for the front. I have a lot of enthusiasm; Of course, the camp is safe and the possibility of martyrdom is low and I do not consider myself worthy of this position. Because time is short, I will write down a few sentences as a testament on the opposite page of this page.

We left for the airport at half past seven. Due to doubts about the departure time, the companions were delayed for two or three hours at the airport. We flew to Dezful with an escort. We arrived at nine o'clock. We had dinner on the plane. Mr. Sayad [Shirazi] and Mr. Rahim Safavi and Jami were in the base. We went to the former Khatam al-Anbia camp with a Land Cruiser. The main camp is in Hamid [Barracks]. We will be here temporarily until it is complete. The camp was formed with the presence of the commanders Sayad [Shirazi], [Mohsen] Rezaei, Rahim [Safavi], Hosni Saadi, Qavidel, Dr. [Hassan] Rouhani, Bashir... Mohsen Rezaei was upset about the delay of the attack due to public information about the attack and the new movements of the enemy. After a long discussion, it was decided that it should not be done at the same time as the previous one. We slept late. Considering the problems that have arisen in the work of war due to differences of opinion, I see accepting the responsibility and managing the war as a great sacrifice, which is only for the sake of saving the war from a stalemate and not rejecting the Imam's will, and that there is no other solution.